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THE INSIDER’S ADVANTAGE: CEO EXPERIENCE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
LARGE DIVERSIFIED FIRMS
J. L. Stimpert, Colorado College
Julie A. Chesley, Pepperdine University
Amanda S. Ostrowitz, University of Denver
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Air Force Academy, and participants offered many helpful comments. Also a special thanks to Professor William Donoher of
Missouri State University and many other participants at the Business and Leadership Symposium at Fort Hays State
University for their helpful feedback and suggestions.
Much upper echelons research focuses on the effect of CEO experience on firm performance outcomes. This paper
extends this research stream using human and social capital theories as a framework to examine the effect of CEO
experience on the performance of large diversified companies. Our analysis of 239 Fortune “500” companies finds that
larger companies are more likely to select insiders and individuals who have more firm-specific experience to be their
CEO. We also find that the selection of insiders and CEOs with more firm-specific experience is associated with
significantly higher firm performance. These findings highlight the importance of the human and social capital
possessed by company insiders, and shed additional light on the strategic leadership of large diversified companies and
other complex organizations.
likely than their smaller and less diversified counterparts to
select insider CEOs, and whether insider CEOs and those
with more firm-specific experience are associated with
higher firm performance.

Upper echelons research emphasizes the value of the
human and social capital provided by firms’ CEOs and other
top managers (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Castanias & Helfat,
1991). Some scholars claim that the human and social
capital contributed by top executives may be a firm’s most
important and enduring source of competitive advantage
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 2000; Moran, 2005). Yet, more
than 50 specific studies examining the influence of CEO
background on firm performance have produced few
consistent findings (Karaevli, 2007). In reviewing this
literature, Karaevli attributes the disparity in research
findings to the use of unsophisticated measures of CEO
background and to a lack of appreciation for the importance
of organizational context, and she urges researchers to adopt
more refined measures of CEO origin and to give more
attention to the importance of contextual factors.
This paper builds on these ideas and suggestions by
incorporating key insights from the human and social capital
literature, and by employing a new, more refined measure of
CEO experience. We also examine the influence of CEO
experience in the specific and important context of large
diversified firms because human and social capital are likely
to be especially valuable resources that play a key role in the
effective management of these complex organizations. We
begin by reviewing the literature on executive experience,
focusing on the executive succession literature, research on
the management of diversification, and the literature on
human and social capital. We use insights from these
literature streams to develop a rationale for selecting
company insiders and those with more firm-specific
experience to be the CEOs of large diversified firms. We
then empirically examine whether these firms are more

BACKGROUND AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Firms are much more inclined to hire insiders than
outsiders as CEO. For many years, researchers at Booz
Allen Hamilton have been tracking succession patterns in
2,500 large firms, and find that outsider CEOs tend to be
hired in only 20 to 30 percent of all successions, though this
percentage can vary considerably from year to year (Lucier,
Kocourek, & Habber, 2006).
Many factors explain why insiders have an edge in CEO
selection, but nearly all of the factors are consistent with
human and social capital perspectives. For example,
insiders are likely to have an advantage in understanding
their company’s competitive landscape and its strategic
position (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Social capital theory
suggest that insiders also benefit from their knowledge of
and ties to other senior executives. And a more homogenous
top management team composed largely of insiders is likely
to be more cohesive, communicate more frequently, and
achieve higher levels of integration (Zenger & Lawrence,
1989).
Studies also document that the selection of an outsider
CEO is often accompanied by high rates of senior
management turnover (Helmich & Brown, 1972). Thus,
boards may fear that the selection of an outsider CEO could
prompt an exodus of senior executives and a loss of
management talent and knowledge (Kesner & Sebora, 1994;
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improvement in performance is more likely to follow the
succession event, regardless of whether an insider or an
outsider is chosen to lead. Thus, context matters a good
deal, and succession studies that make use of panel design
methodologies face the risk of being influenced by a
regression to the mean phenomenon.
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) studied the
effect of CEO background in high-tech firms and found that
performance improves following the hiring of either an
insider or an outsider. Perhaps firms competing in high-tech
contexts benefit from the perspectives provided by any new
CEO, regardless of background. Another study of a wide
range of industries showed near-term firm performance is
nearly four times better when poor-performing firms hire an
outsider to be CEO, but that insiders produced higher longterm results (Lucier et al., 2006). Other studies come to
different conclusions, again depending on context. Denis
and Denis (1995) report, not surprisingly, that performance
improves following the forced resignation of a CEO. And,
reflecting perhaps the regression to the mean phenomenon,
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that firm
performance deteriorates in the years before CEO turnover
and then improves, but that performance improvements are
greater when the new CEO is an outsider.

Pfeffer, 1981). In addition, boards often have difficulty
evaluating outsider candidates, giving insiders, who are
much more likely to be known quantities, a significant edge
in succession decisions (Shen & Cannella, 2002).
Given the preference for hiring insiders, much of the
research on executive succession has examined when and
why firms chose to deviate from this tendency and hire
outsiders (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Many studies
have examined the role of firm performance as an antecedent
to CEO succession decisions, and most, but not all, find that
outsiders tend to be hired when firms are experiencing poor
performance (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Dalton & Kesner,
1985), when they are implementing turnaround strategies
(Bibeault, 1982), or when poor performance is equated with
the need for a change in strategy (Cannella & Lubatkin,
1993). Lucier and colleagues found that more than 80
percent of the firms that hired outsiders as CEO were
experiencing poor performance in the prior two years
(Lucier et al., 2006).
Arguments supporting these empirical findings are quite
intuitive. Outsiders are viewed as advantageous to firms
suffering from poor performance because they are believed
to be more likely to bring a new perspective. The hiring of
an insider, on the other hand, is viewed as part of a
maintenance strategy and an attachment to the status quo
(Helmich & Brown, 1972). Thus, again, consistent with
human and social capital arguments, boards face a paradox
in selecting a CEO – insider candidates know the company
and other executives, but may be unable to see the need (if it
exists) for a change in strategy. On the other hand, outsiders
may see the need for a change in strategy, but could face
significant challenges in implementing strategic changes
because they lack knowledge of the firm and its industry and
do not have established relationships with the firm’s senior
executives (Bower, 2007; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997).

The Value of Executive Experience in Diversified Firms
Because of their size and complexity, large diversified
firms are a context in which human and social capital is
likely to be especially valuable, abundant, and, because of its
specificity, also very difficult to share or transfer (Prahalad
& Bettis, 1986; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990). Finkelstein
and Hambrick (1996) underscore that the executives of large
diversified firms must manage not just a single business, but
a portfolio of often quite varied businesses. CEOs and other
top executives of these firms must acquire a broad
understanding of the product and geographic markets in
which their firms’ businesses compete (Naveen, 2006), as
well as knowledge of the different technologies and
processes associated with the business units that make up
their firms’ portfolios of businesses (Pehrsson, 2006;
Piscitello, 2004).
In addition to understanding their firms’ unique
portfolios of individual businesses – their competitive
situation, positioning within the competitive environment,
resources and capabilities, and cash flow characteristics –
executives leading diversified firms must also have detailed
understandings of how these businesses are related to each
other and how they together are a part of the larger
diversified firm (Porter, 1987; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997).
Based on these understandings, executives will develop
elaborate mental models about how to derive synergies from
their firms’ diversification strategy, which will also become
manifested in organizational processes, procedures, and
routines (Goold & Campbell, 1987).

The Influence of Leader Experience on Organizational
Performance
In her review of the executive succession literature,
Karaevli (2007) notes its inconsistent findings and
concludes: 1) that researchers need more refined measures
of what it means to be an insider or an outsider, and 2) that
researchers need to be more attentive to the contextual
factors that moderate the relationship between managerial
origin and performance. Karaevli’s own research used a
new measure of “outsiderness” based on the extent of CEO
experience in both the firm and its industry, and she
examined CEO successions only in the airline and chemical
industries. Her study concluded that CEO background has
no main effects on firm performance, but that it does have
significant moderating influences on performance.
In an earlier review, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)
highlight an important point made in an early study by
Gamson and Scotch (1964) – that succession frequently
follows a period of poor performance. As a result, an
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CEO Experience and the Performance of Large Diversified
Firms
Regardless of whether large diversified firms are more
likely to select insiders or individuals with more years of
company experience as their CEO, our theorizing suggests
that performance will be higher in those large diversified
firms that do. Focusing on firms in a service industry, Kor
and Leblebici (2005) note that outside executives are likely
to offer their firm new and novel knowledge, while insiders
are more likely to draw on their firm’s existing knowledge
and capabilities. But the findings of their study also
highlight the difficulties outsiders experience when
attempting to share and implement their new ideas and when
attempting to assimilate their firms’ specialized knowledge
and skills. Given the elaborate routines, processes, and
procedures that diversified firms will have in place to
manage diversification, implement their corporate strategies,
and derive synergies from their portfolio of businesses,
insider executives who have obtained a sophisticated
knowledge and understanding of these processes and
procedures, as well as social and network ties and
interpersonal trust, should be associated with higher firm
performance (Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). Applying these
human and social capital arguments to the management of
large diversified firms suggests the following hypothesis:

For example, prior studies describe how diversified
firms develop procedures to apply a common technology or
set of technological capabilities across business or product
lines (Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007; Pehrsson, 2006;
Piscitello, 2004). Other studies shed light on how
diversified firms develop functional skills and organizational
processes that can be applied across all of their businesses,
even when those businesses may lack common product or
service characteristics (Mason & Harris, 2005; Porter, 1985,
1987; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). Still other studies
show how firms, often those pursuing unrelated
diversification strategies, develop elaborate financial
reporting procedures and resource allocation processes to
promote the efficient functioning of internal capital markets
(Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1975). All of these approaches to
deriving synergies require extensive firm-specific human
capital that is likely to be difficult to acquire quickly or
transfer easily.
Effective management of a large diversified firm also
requires significant social capital. Moran (2005) emphasizes
that social capital includes not only the configuration of
social ties among key management personnel, but also the
quality of those social ties. While the configuration of
interpersonal relationships refers to “the presence or absence
of network ties between actors, along with other structural
features like connectivity, centrality and hierarchy,” the
quality of those relationships is a function of the level of
“interpersonal trust and trustworthiness, overlapping
identities, and feelings of closeness or interpersonal
solidarity” (2005: 1,132). Again, the diversified context is
one in which higher levels of social capital are likely to be
especially helpful in effectively managing the inherent
complexity since social capital enhances communication
among executives and managers. Enhanced communication
will facilitate the effective management of individual
businesses, and it will also be essential to the efficient
coordination of business units and efforts to derive synergies
from those businesses.

Hypothesis 2: Large diversified firms that have an
insider as their CEO will enjoy higher performance.
Past studies have acknowledged that insider/outsider
status is an overly simplistic dichotomy, and that it makes a
good deal of difference whether an individual has no
experience, two years, or 20 years of experience with a
company prior to becoming a CEO (Karaevli, 2007). Going
beyond whether a CEO is an insider or an outsider, it is also
reasonable to hypothesize that as executives spend more
time at large diversified companies they will have more
opportunities to acquire an in-depth understanding of their
companies’ processes, procedures, routines, and other types
of firm-specific knowledge and become fully knowledgeable
of the social and network ties and relationships within these
companies. Thus, we would expect that less experienced
executives will not be associated with high performance in
large diversified companies, but that more experienced
executives should be positively associated with performance
outcomes. One previous study has found that the CEOs of
more diversified companies tend to be older and have more
years of education than their counterparts in less diversified
companies (Berry et al., 2006). This finding also implies the
importance of firm-specific human and social capital in
successfully managing the organizational complexity
associated with highly diversified firms. Thus, we
hypothesize:

CEO Hiring Patterns in Large Diversified Firms
Given the challenge of understanding both the
complexity and the vast amount of firm-specific knowledge
that are associated with the management of a large
diversified firm, it seems plausible that these firms would be
more likely to opt for insiders and those with more firmspecific human and social capital when selecting their CEO.
Stated formally:
Hypothesis 1a: Large diversified firms are more
likely to have insiders as CEO.
Hypothesis 1b: Large diversified firms are more
likely to have individuals with more years of
company experience as CEO.

Hypothesis 3: The number of years an executive
spends with a large diversified company before
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firm employment levels were obtained from the Fortune
database.
Diversification was assessed in 2004 using the
continuous entropy measure of diversification (Palepu,
1985). This continuous measure uses SIC codes and
business unit sales data to evaluate the extent of
diversification, and tests of its validity have supported its use
as a measure of diversification (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &
Moesel, 1993). Data to compute our diversification measure
were obtained from Mergent Online.
Industry profitability exerts a considerable influence on
firm performance (Rumelt, 1991), so we control for industry
effects by including a measure of industry profitability.
Data on industry performance in 2004 were obtained from
Fortune.
We control for the length of time an individual has
served as CEO and measure CEO tenure as of 2004. Data
were obtained from Dun and Bradstreet’s Handbook of
Corporate Managements, 2004.

becoming CEO will be positively associated with
firm performance.
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES
The sample was composed of 250 firms chosen
randomly from the 2004 Fortune magazine’s “500 Largest
Firms” in order to include firms that are both large and
diversified in the study. Of the initial set of 250 firms, we
excluded 11 firms for which complete data were unavailable
or were presented in an inconsistent format. This resulted in
a final sample for this study of 239 firms.
Firm performance is measured using average return on
assets (ROA) for the three years 2004 through 2006. The
use of ROA in this study is consistent with the performance
measure used in many studies examining the influence of
CEO background and experience. ROA is less influenced
by capital structure than ROE, and it is not as subject to the
volatility that is present in market-based performance
measures. And, by using a three-year average, we minimize
the impact of one-year swings in accounting performance
that can be attributed to one-time factors. Firm performance
data were obtained from the Mergent Online database.
We define insiders as CEOs who had tenures of two or
more years with their company before their appointment as
CEO (Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987; Datta & Guthrie, 1994;
Davidson et al., 1990; Vancil, 1987). Outsiders were defined
as CEOs who had less than two years experience with their
company before their appointment as CEO. Data on
insider/outsider status were obtained from Dun and
Bradstreet’s Handbook of Corporate Managements, 2004.
To explore in a more detailed way the value of firmspecific CEO experience (Karaevli, 2007), we include a
measure of the number of years executives were with a
company prior to becoming CEO. This is equal to the
natural logarithm of one plus the absolute number of years
individuals were with a company before their appointment
as CEO. Data for this measure were obtained from Dun and
Bradstreet’s Handbook of Corporate Managements, 2004.
To examine the influence of size on the decision to
select insiders and those with more firm-specific experience,
and then later to control for the documented effect that firm
size has on performance and a wide range of strategic
decisions, we included the natural logarithm of the number
of employees in 2004 in our statistical analyses. Data on

RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all of
the variables included in the study can be obtained from the
authors. Hypothesis 1a suggested that large diversified firms
would be more likely than smaller and less diversified firms
to have insiders as CEO, and Hypothesis 1b proposed that
large diversified firms would be more likely than smaller
and less diversified firms to have executives with more firmspecific experience. Since the insider variable is
dichotomous, we used Logit analysis to test Hypothesis 1a,
and because the years with company variable is continuous,
we used regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1b. The
results of these tests are summarized in Table 1. Lending
partial support to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we found the firm
size variable to be significant and positively associated with
the decision to have an insider CEO and a CEO with more
years of firm-specific experience. However, the
diversification variable is not significantly associated with
the decision to select an insider to be CEO and it is only
modestly associated with hiring an individual with more
years of firm-specific experience. Thus, it appears that firm
size is a more significant influence than the extent of
diversification on the selection of insiders and executives
with more firm-specific experience as CEO.
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TABLE 1
Are Large Diversified Firms More Likely to Have Insiders and Executives
with More Years of Company-Specific Experience As Their CEO?
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent Variable:
Insider
CEO

Years with
Company

Intercept

-2.06
(1.28)

Firm Size

.27
(.13)

Firm Diversity

.17
(.27)

Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio

5.43

.77
(.57)
*

.15
(.06)

**

.20
(.16)

+

+

R-Square

.04

F Statistic

5.4

N
+
*
**
***

239

**

239

p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p < .001

Summaries of the results of regression analyses
examining Hypotheses 2 and 3 are shown in Table 2. Model
1 summarizes the influence of the control variables on firm
performance, showing that industry profitability and firm
size are significant and positively associated with firm
performance. Model 2 examines the influence of these
control variables and the insider CEO variable on firm
performance. Supporting Hypothesis 2, which proposed that
firm performance will be higher when large diversified firms

have insiders as CEO, the insider variable is both positive
and significant. Model 3 examined the influence of the
control variables and the years with company variable on
firm performance. (CEO tenure is not included in this model
due to its high correlation with the years with company
variable.) Providing strong support for Hypothesis 3, the
years with the company variable is highly significant and
positively associated with ROA.
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TABLE 2
The Influence of Insider CEOs and CEOs with More
Years of Firm-Specific Experience on Firm Performance
(dependent variable in all models is ROA, standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1
Intercept

-6.53
(2.83)

Model 2
*

-6.55
(2.81)

Model 3
*

-6.54
(2.78)

*

Industry
Profitability

1.32
(.13)

***

1.35
(.13)

***

1.31
(.13)

***

Firm Size

.60
(.27)

*

.50
(.27)

+

.46
(.27)

+

Firm Diversity

-.02
(.57)

-.05
(.57)

CEO Tenure

.06
(.04)

.04
(.04)

Insider

1.62
(.69)

-.15
(.57)

*

Years with
Company

.84
(.32)

R-Square

.32

F Statistic

27.83

N
+
*
**
***

.34

.34
***

23.81

239

239

**

***

29.80

***

239

p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p < .001

firms led by insiders enjoyed higher mean levels of ROA.
And, as predicted, the subgroup of more diversified firms led
by insider CEOs significantly outperforms the subgroup of
more diversified firms led by outsider CEOs.
Second, we subdivided our groups of firms into four
subgroups based on the extent of diversification and the
CEO’s years of firm-specific experience (as determined by
the median values for diversification and the years with
company variable). We then calculated mean ROA for these
four subgroups as shown in Table 4. Again, the two
subgroups of firms led by CEOs with more years of firmspecific experience enjoy higher levels of mean ROA than
their counterparts that are led by CEOs with fewer years of
firm-specific experience. Comparing the two more
diversified subgroups of firms, those led by CEOs with more
firm-specific experience significantly outperform the firms
led by CEOs with fewer years of firm-specific experience.

To further explore the influence of insider/outsider
status and years of firm-specific experience on firm
performance outcomes in diversified firms, we conducted
additional analyses examining performance differences
across less and more diversified groups of firms. We first
divided our sample of 239 firms into two groups by the
median level of diversification. We then further divided
these two groups into insider and outsider subgroups and
calculated the mean ROA for these four subgroups as shown
in Table 3.
As summarized in Table 3, the distribution of firms
shows only a slightly higher number of the more diversified
firms are led by insiders than their less diversified
counterparts, and similarly, only a slightly higher number of
the less diversified firms are led by outsiders than their more
diversified counterparts. As predicted by the arguments
summarized in this paper, however, the two subgroups of
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TABLE 3
Performance Differences in Less Diversified and
More Diversified Firms Led by Insiders and Outsiders

+
*
**
***

Less Diversified

More Diversified

Insider

N = 81
Mean ROA = 5.53
Variance = 46.16

N = 85
Mean ROA = 5.66
Variance = 23.39

Outsider

N = 39
Mean ROA = 4.52
Variance = 40.90

N = 34
Mean ROA = 3.79
Variance = 16.46

ROA diff. = 1.02
df = 80
t-statistic = .80, n.s.

ROA diff. = 1.87
df = 72
t-statistic = 2.15 *

p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p < .001

TABLE 4
Performance Differences in Less Diversified and More Diversified Firms
Led by CEOs with More and Less Years of Firm-Specific Experience

+
*
**
***

Less Diversified

More Diversified

More Years of
Firm-Specific
Experience

N = 53
Mean ROA = 5.99
Variance = 59.02

N = 65
Mean ROA = 6.05
Variance = 25.11

Less Years of
Firm-Specific
Experience

N = 67
Mean ROA = 4.66
Variance = 32.46

N = 54
Mean ROA = 3.61
Variance = 15.78

ROA diff. = 1.34
df = 93
t-statistic = 1.06, n.s.

ROA diff. = 2.44
df = 117
t-statistic = 2.60 **

p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p < .001
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study illustrates, it is highly valuable and is associated with
significantly higher performance. Studies cited earlier in
this paper suggest that boards may select an outsider CEO in
response to poor performance, but many of these studies also
indicate that this move may be a short-term expedient that
will fail to insure longer-run success (Karlsson et al., 2008;
Lucier et al., 2006).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Contributions to Theory and Practice
Though most strategy researchers would agree with
Rumelt that “the critical resource of the modern, diversified,
divisionalized firm is general management skill” (1974:
156), previous research includes relatively few studies that
have explicitly incorporated human variables in an effort to
understand the antecedents of firm performance in large
diversified firms. For anyone who accepts the view that
human and social capital is an important source of
advantage, this study’s findings are unlikely to come as a
surprise. Yet, all too often management research tends to
view the leadership of such firms as a “faceless abstraction”
(Bettis & Prahalad, 1995: 6), and, aside from a few
noteworthy exceptions (e.g., Michael & Hambrick, 1992;
Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), the
diversification and corporate strategy literatures have largely
ignored the role of executives and top managers in
formulating and implementing strategies and the importance
of human and social capital as an influence on firm
performance.
Our study finds that large firms are more likely to select
insiders and those with more years of company-specific
experience as CEO. On the other hand, we also find that
more diversified firms are not more likely to select insiders
and only somewhat more likely to select CEOs who have
more years of firm-specific experience. These results
suggest it is the complexity associated with firm size rather
than the extent of diversification that primarily drives the
decision to select insiders and those with more years of firmspecific experience to be CEO.
Our study supports our hypothesis that large diversified
firms will enjoy higher performance when they have insiders
as CEO. We also contribute to theory by suggesting a new,
more refined measure of executive experience or
background, the number of years of company-specific
experience. Prior studies of executive experience that have
employed the insider/outsider dichotomy have
acknowledged that it is fairly arbitrary in the way it
distinguishes among executives who have had varying
degrees of prior experience before becoming CEO (Karaevli,
2007). Our development and use of the years of experience
variable highlights the importance of human and social
capital in large diversified firms. In addition, our finding
that the number of years of company-specific experience is
associated with higher firm performance suggests the
importance of using this new measure and the insights that
can be gained from it.
Our findings also have significant practical value. As
boards develop succession plans and hire CEOs, they should
be mindful of the firm-specific human and social capital
possessed by company insiders and those with more
company-specific experience. The value of this human and
social capital may be too easily taken for granted but, as our

Suggestions for Future Research
Previous studies have shown that firms have a tendency
to hire outsiders during times of poor performance and that
performance tends to improve following the hiring of an
outsider CEO (although several researchers have suggested
that this performance improvement may be unrelated to the
choice of CEO and may, in fact, reflect a regression to the
mean). While we did not examine the relationships among
prior firm performance, choice of CEO, and subsequent firm
performance, a study pursuing this line of inquiry would be a
logical follow-up to our research. Similarly, it would be
interesting to examine the performance consequences of
hiring outsider CEOs who have prior experience in more
diversified firms versus those who have either no or very
little prior experience in diversified firms.
Likewise, it would be interesting to know something
about the tenures of insider and outsider CEOs. For
example, do insider CEOs have longer tenures than outsider
CEOs and are outsider CEOs more likely to move on to
leadership opportunities at other firms? It would also be
interesting to determine if discernable differences exist
between the strategies adopted by insider and outsider CEOs
of large diversified firms. For example, it might be
reasonable to hypothesize that outsider CEOs, in an effort to
improve firm performance, are more likely to change their
firms’ diversification strategies since they lack a
commitment to their firms’ past strategies (Bigley &
Wiersema, 2002; Wiersema, 1992). One recent study
examining how CEO background influences the relationship
between strategic change and firm performance offers some
interesting parallels with this study. Zhang and Rajagopalan
find that the long-run performance effects of major changes
in strategy are enhanced when they are initiated by insider
rather than outsider CEOs. They conclude that insider CEOs
enjoy higher long-run performance because “they are more
likely to initiate and implement strategic changes that build
upon existing organizational capabilities” (2010: 343).
Another avenue for research that would have both
theoretical and practical value would be to follow-up on
Bower’s (2007) idea of developing individuals with the
capacity to be “inside-outside” executives, or executives
who have the intimate firm-specific knowledge of insiders
and the perspective of outsiders. We believe that executives
are often too narrowly dichotomized as insiders linked to the
status quo or as outsider change agents, when companies
actually need CEOs who can simultaneously understand the
importance of exploiting existing competencies while also
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